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RENT REGULATION UNDER THE POLICE POWER 
CONDITIONS resulting from the widespread housing shortage caused by the cessation of building during the war have given 
rise to legislation which must seem startling indeed to much of, the 
legal talent surviving from a generation ago. The outstancfmg 
example is to be found in the New York laws which so far have 
succeeded admirably in eluding the constitutional pitfalls relied 
upon to nullify them. Three provisions have borne the brunt of 
the attack. The first prevents the recovery of an wireasonable rent 
in an action at law, and places the burden of showing reasonable-
ness upon the landlord.1 Another suspends for two years the land-
lord's right to maintain summary proceedings for dispossession 
except in four instances.2 These are: (a) where the tenant is 
objectionable, (b r where the landlord, befo~ a natural person, 
desires the premises for his own personal use, ( c) where the land· 
lord desires to construct a new building on the site of the qld one, 
and ( d) where the building has been sold to a cooperativ~ apart-
ment company. A third provision suspends the right to maintain 
ejectment in the same manner.8 In general, these provisions have 
been sustained," but the last was decfared invalid by the Supreme 
Court, Appellate Division of the First Department, in Guttag v. 
Shatzkin,,,, chiefly on the ground that it impaired the obligation of 
existing contracts in that it was the final enactment of the legisla-
ture culminating in the removal of ev~ry remedy, excepting in the 
particular instances stated, of an owner for the recovery of the 
possession of real property occupied by tenants whose terms had 
expired and who were under contract ohl~gations e.."Cpressed in the 
s C. 944 amending c. 136 of the April Laws. 
• C. 942. Also c. 945 (unreasonableness a defense in action for summary · 
eviction for non-payment of rent). 
•c. 947. 
•Ullman Realty Co. v. Tamur, 185 N. Y. S. 612; Levy Leasing Co. v. 
Siegel, 186 N. Y. S. S; People v. Fagan, 186 N. Y. S. 24; People v. La F.etra, 
186 N. Y. S. 58; Brown Holding Co. v. Feldman (D. C., S. D., N. Y., Dec. 
15, J!)20), 
'186 N. Y. S. 47 (Dec. 24, 1!)20). 
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leases or implied' by" law to vacate the premises and surrender pos-
session: thereof to their landlord. 
The evils sought to be remedied are the charging of extortionate 
rentals made possible by the shortage, coupled with the fact that 
shelter is a necessity, and the impending wholesale evictions due to 
the inability of thousands of families to pay increased rentals.6 In 
preventing the recovery of unreasonable rentals the legislature 
might seem to have achieved all that is desired, inasmuch as the 
landlord no longer has an object in exchanging one satisfactory 
tenant for another. Practically, however, it is obvious that the 
provision is futile so long as the landlord retains a menacing weapon 
over the head of the tenant such as the possibility of eviction with-
out shelter available elsewhere. The net result of the legislation is 
to prevent the landlord from making an arbitrary change of tenants 
from which he can derive no lawful gain. If he desires to continue 
to use his property in the business of renting, and has a satisfactory 
tenant paying a reasonable rental, he has all that he is entitled to. 
This should be borne in mind throughout. 
The chief constitutional objection, of course, is that the landlord 
is deprived of his property without "due process.",, The answer is 
that the business of renting houses is affected "with a public int<".r-
est,'' and therefore subject to regulation under the police power. 
If the regulation of the housing business is a· proper exercise of 
the police power, there remains the question of whether the means 
adopted are reasonably related tO the end SOUght to be aCCOmplished.T 
It is not proposed to enter into any extended discussion as to when 
businesses or property may be said to be so affected, but it is sub-
mitted that the principle of Munn v. Illinois8 has been extended to 
nothing more closely analogous than the business of furnishing 
shelter to human beings. Whether the test applied is to be the 
peculiar possibilities of the particular industry as an instrument of 
oppression under existing economic conditions,0 or what amounts 
•Message of the Governor (Sept. 20, 1920); Levy Leasing Co. v. Siegel, 
1~ N. Y. S. S; Report of the Joint Legislative Committee on Housing, Sept. 
20, 1920. 
'Ullman Realty Co. v. Tamur, 185 N. Y:- S. 612. 
•Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S n3. 
• 19 MxcH. L. ~v. 74. 
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to the same thing, perhaps, whether the social interest is sufficiently 
strong to counterbalance the interference with individual interests,1° 
the business of renting seems a proper one for regulation. And the 
means are clear~ reasonably related to the particular ends sought 
to be accomplished, despite the objection that they do not add one 
square foot tc> the supply of dwelling accommodations.u 
A recent writer presents an interesting but, it is believed, au 
unsound view as to the nature of the New York laws and the basis 
on which they rest, or should be rested.12 The theory advanced is 
that an appeal to the police power is not only unnecessary but 
improper. The provision preventing the recovery of an unreason-
able rental is merely declaratory of an ancient power of courts of 
equity not dependent on any statute, namely, the power to set aside 
contracts shown to have been procured by duress. The provision 
,suspending the right to maintain summary proceedings is justified 
on the ground that there is no vested right in a statutory remedy, 
and that the legislature can take it away altogether, if it so desires, 
by virtue of its ordinary power to legislate without any reference 
to police power. The provision suspending the right to maintain 
ejectment is apparently abandoned as hopeless. The shortage, 
together with the fact that housing is necessary, is relied upon as 
constituting such duress as to make the lease voidable. It works 
out thus : The landlord brings his action for the recovery of rent, 
and the tenant interposes the equitable defense that the contract 
was procured by duress. The contract is then set aside and the 
landlord falls ,back upon the implied contract and recovers the rea-
sonable value for use and occupation. The flaw in the theory seems 
to be that there is no duress of the sort for which equity gives relief. 
True, the doctrine of duress has been considerably extended and 
some courts have used language indicating that all that is necessary 
is that the freedom of will of the contracting party is overcome so 
that there is no real meeting of minds.13 One element of the early 
law still persists, however, and that is that the pressure must be 
11 33 HARV. L. IU:v. 838. 
11 Judge Blackmar (dissenting) in People v. Fagan, 186 N. Y. S. 24, 36 
(Dec. '/. 1920). 
11 "The New York Landlord and Tenant Laws," VI CoRN. L .. QUAllT. r . 
.. IS MICH. L. REV. 228. 
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wrongful, and it is not sufficient that a party is constrained to enter 
into a transaction by force of circumstances for which the other 
· party is not responsible.u This theory would take care of the objec-
tion that preexisting contracts are impaired, in rather neat fashion, 
but the writer is led to an odd conclusion as to the validity of the 
legislation if applied to subsequent contracts. He says that if it is 
held to apply to these a premium is placed on fraudulent conduct 
on the part of the tenant, in that he may accept any terms offered 
by the landlord for the sake of remaining in possession, knowing 
that the contract is presumptively void if the rent is higher than 
that of the year previous .• It is rather difficult to perceive that any 
1,Ulconscionable advantage is taken by the tenant under the circum-
stances. He also concludes that it is invalid if applied to subse-
quent leases as an unconstitutional interference with private prop-
erty, ·because it prevents the landlord from leasing his property at 
its market value. Obviously, this begs the whole question and is 
scarcely consistent with the duress theory. The only possible basis 
on which the legislation can be sustained would seem to be the 
police pbwer of the state.1 r; 
Although the housing situation has resulted in a mass of legh:la-
tion touching various aspects o~ it,18 there seems to have been almost 
no litigation outside of New Y-0rk except in the District of Colum-
bia. In May of 1918, Congress passed the Saulsbury resolution,11 
which was held unconstitutional in Willson v. McDonnell,18 This 
prohibited eviction so long as the tenant paid the rent and was 
satisfactory, in effect prolonging existing leases for the duration of 
the act. This was held invalid on the ground that as it affected 
only existing leases it discriminated in favor of landlords whose 
property was then unincumbered. The court refused to consider 
the question as to whether or not the business of renting had become 
,. WIU.ISTO.N ON CoNTRACTs, Vol. III, pp. 2833, 2836. 
8 The cases suggest no other basis. The situation has been said to be 
such as ·to warrant the t'Xercise of the power of eminent domain. Ullman 
Realty Co. v. Tamur, 185 N. Y. S. 612; Willson v. McDonnt'll, 265 Fed. 43:?. 
Cf. Opinion of the Justices, 2n Mass. 624. 
•See "Rent Regulation and the Housing Problem" in the Journal issutd 
ht the American Bar Association, January, 1921. 
ST 40 STAT. AT L. 593. 
•Willson v. McDonnell, 265 Fed. "32. 
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"affected with a public interest." In October,_ 1919, Congress 
adopted the Ball Rent Law,19 which was held unconstitutional in 
Hirsch v. Block.20 The provisions covered much the same ground 
as the New York laws except that a rent commission was provided 
for, with power to regulate rents and service, whereas what amounts 
to regulation of rates in New York is left to the courts. A New 
York case21 distinguishes the Ball law on the grounds that it was 
wider in scope than the New York laws and took away the right 
of trial by jury in actions to recover land in violation of the Sev-
enth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. WhateYer merit 
there may be in such distinctions, it is clear that the Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia would not uphold the New 
York legislation nor any other. The court says in part: 
"Plaintiff had a vested estate and a reversion in fee in the 
property in question to come into pos~ession on January l, 
1920. * * * The right of reversion is a property right of 
which the plaintiff cannot be divested except by due process 
of law. * * * Nor does this amount to the taking of private 
property for public use. Plaintiff and defendant are private 
citizens, engaged in a private business. * * * The power to 
fix rental rates between private individuals is not analogous 
to nor controlled by the decisions which' have upheld the 
power of the legislature to fix rates for service where the 
owner has devoted the business affected to a public use. * * ** 
In no case where the legislative power to fix rates has been 
upheld has the power to continue existing contracts in force 
after the time fixed by the partJes for their termination,' or 
to require the owner of the property to continue the business 
been sustained. * * * A public interest cannot be thus cre-
ated, or property rights be divested, by an arbitrary exercise 
of the police power." 
Contrast with this the much-quoted recent opinion of Judge 
"BAI.r. RtN'l'_ I.Aw, 41 S'l'A'l'. AT L. 298. 
"Hirsch v. Block,~ Fed. 614- Cf. dissenting opinion of Chief Justice 
Smyth. 
"'Ullman Realty Co. v. Tamur, 185 N. Y. S. 612. 
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Baker in the case of the American Coal Mining Company v. The 
Special Coal and Food Commission of Indiana:~2 
"Are the sovereign people helpless in such a situation? 
(oppression by extortionate rates for fuel and housing made 
possible by shortages). They certainly are if the Fourteenth 
Amendment stopped the narrowing of these various circles 
within which persons theretofore might move freely with 
respect to life, liberty and property. But otherwise not. The 
police power is continuous. It has always existed, and nec-
essarily must always exist. And it is as wide as any con-
ceivable sovereignty can ·be." 
The District of Columbia court evidently became so engrossed 
in a study of form that substance was completely ignored. 
The obvious advantages of creating a rent conlmission to 
regulate housing conditions generally, and particularly rates, led 
to a proposed statute by Professor Wigmore in a recent article in 
the l:t.J.INOIS LAW Ritvn~w.11 Professor Wigmore rightly contends 
that a court is a poor piece of machinery for rate-making, especially 
since, theoretically, the effect of its decision must be confined to the 
~se before it. The proposed statute applies only to future leases 
and provides no remedy for the wholesale evictions against which 
the New York laws have attempted to guard, other than to take 
away any substantial reason the landlord might have for making a 
change by limiting his return for the future to a reasonable amount. 
The author makes three claims of superiority for his measure which 
merit attention: First, that it is constitutional. This is conceded, 
tne Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia notwithstanding. 
But it is yet to be demonstrated that the New York legislation is 
less meritorious in this respect. Second, that it is fair in that it 
imposes no arbitrary rule; but enables discrimination to be made 
between the grasping_ profiteer and the meritorious landlord. If 
each gets what he is justly entitled to and no more-i. e., a reason-
able re1'Jm-it is hard to see any possibility of such discrimination, 
and .it is equally difficult to see how rentals could be regulated on 
·~ Fed. s63 (Seift: 6, 192()). 
•"A Coustitutiohal .Way to Reach the "Housing Profiteer," 15 Ir.r.. L. 
REv. 359-
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any other basis. The third advantage, that a conunission is supe-
rior to throwing the whole burden on the courts, may be conceded. 
Legislation which leaves the landlord able to dislodge a satisfactory 
tenant, however, would scarcely seem sufficient to counterbalance 
the obvious objections on the policy side to any and all regulation 
which will be discussed later. 
Aside from the taking of property without due process, there is 
but one other constitutional objection to the New York legislation 
which deserves mention, which is that preexisting contracts are 
impaired in violation of the Federal Constitution. This contention 
is supported in the February number of the HARVARD LAW REVIEW~" 
and by the Supreme Court, Appellate Division of the First Depart-
ment, in Guttag v. Schatzkin,25 previously referred to. This view 
is believed to be untenable. It is said that in every case in which 
the impairment of existing contracts has been held valid the expla-
nation is to be found in the fact that the contract apparently impaired 
has been that of a state purporting to bargain away a part of its 
sovereignty, in which case the contract is void ab initio, or that of 
a public utility in derogation of its cqmmon law duty to render a 
reasonable service to all, which is at least voidable. But it is con-
ceded that a general law which incidentally impairs the obligation 
of private contracts is not for that reason invalid,.and a distinction 
is attempted between such a law and the New York provisions on 
the ground that the latter attack the contract directly by taking 
away all remedies whereby the landlord can enforce the express or 
implied contract in every lease to give up possession at the end of 
the term. The primary purpose of the New York laws, however, 
is to protect the individual, not for his sake but because of the legis-
lative finding, as expressed in the law, that in so doing public 
health, safety, and general welfare are best subserved.2d If this is 
conceded, the attempted distinction is meaningless, and the law is 
clearly a general one which only incidentally impairs contract~ 
between individuals. 
"This power, which in its various ramifications is- known 
"34 HARV. L. R.Ev. ¢. 
• Guttag v. Schatzkin, 186 N. Y. S. 4;-. 
•Levy Leasing Co. v. Siegel, 186 N. Y. S. s; Decision by the Court of 
Appeals, March g, 1921, reversing Guttag v. Schatzkin. 
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as the police power, is an exercise of the sovereign right of 
the government to protect the lives, health, morals, comfort, 
and general welfare of the people, and is paramount to any 
rights under contracts between individuals. Familiar instances 
of this are where parties enter into contracts, perfectly law-
ful at the time, to sell liquor, operate a brewery or distillery, 
or carry on a lottery, all of which are subject to impairment 
by a change of policy on the part of the state, prohibiting the 
establishment or continuance of such traffic; in other words, 
that parties by entering into contracts may not estop the legis-
lature from enacting laws intended for the public good."~7 
To the examples mentioned may be added the numerous cases 
where cities have passed ordinances restricting buildings of various 
sorts, sucb as frame houses, in particular districts. Preexisting 
contracts are often impaired, but the ordinances are nevertheless 
valid.28 The principle underlying these cases is indistinguishable 
from that which is applicable here. Why should contract rights he 
more sacred, where public welfare is involved, than other property 
rights? It is scarcely an answer to say that to hold othenvise is 
"going counter to the plain words of the Constitution." In revers-
ing Guttag v. Schatzkin, the Court of Appeals of New York, iri a 
case decided since the foregoing was written, said : 
"Laws directly nullifying some essential part of private 
contracts are rare, and are not lightly to be upheld by heavy 
and sweeping generalization on the common good, but no 
decision upholds the extreme view that the obligation of pri-
vate contracts may never be directly impaired in the exercise 
of the legislative power." 
·The real distinction would seem to be between laV?s passed for 
the general welfare and those primarily for the benefit of one of 
"Manigault v. Springs, 199 1T ,:;. 473. 
• Salem v. Maynes, 123 Mass: 312, Knoxville v. Bird, 12 Lea .(Tenn.) 
~121; New York v. Ncrdje, 68 App. Div. 370; see also People v. Hawley, 3 
Mich. 336; Re Ten-Hour Law for Street Ry. Corps. (R. I.), 54 Atl. 6o2; 
Commonwealth v. Intoxicating Liquor,,us Mass. 153; Jamieson v. Indiana 
Nat. Gas and Oil Co., 128 Ind. 555. 
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the contracting parties.~9 The latter could never be justified as 
police power, but the former cannot be handicapped by contracts 
between individuals. 
On March 7 an opinion was handed down by the Court of 
Appeals sustaining the law on all points,30 and there would seem to 
be no doubt as to the constitutionality of the entire program. Some 
very serious questions of policy remain unsettled, however Noth-
ing is more obvious than the fact that any restrictive legislation is 
bound to drive capital out of the field and postpone the day when 
the fundamental evil, the shortage, is remedied.81 Accompanying 
the newspaper report of the decision is the demand for repeal of 
the laws by the real estate associatior s, and the assurance t~at there 
will be no building while they remain in existence.3 :.: The choice 
between immediate relief and the indefinite postponement of ulti-
mate relief, unless the state itself goes into the building business, 
is a most difficult one, and it remains to be seen whether the Ne·.v 
York legislature has chosen wisely. The choice is for the legislature 
alone, however, not for the courts. 
University of Michigan !~aw School. 
• Fl!sUND ON POLlCS Po~, pp. 583, 584 
11 New York Times, March 9, 1921. 
Ar.AN W. BoYD. 
111'How to Meet the Housing Situation," An.ANTIC MONTHLY, March, 
1921, p. 404; "Rent Regulation and the Housing Problem," from the Journal 
issued by the American Bar Association., January, 1921. 
12 New .York Times, March 9, 1921, p. 4-
